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Eugene V. Rostowt
The question posed is the most important issue in world politics: under
what circumstances may states lawfully resort to the unilateral (and in-
ternational) use of force?
If Articles 2(4) and 51 of the Charter of the United Nations were in
fact part of the living law of the world community, the question would be
easy to answer. Then one could say with assurance that customary inter-
national law, jus gentium, the law distilled from the consent of the na-
tions, had embraced Article 2(4) as a norm and allowed states to use
force unilaterally only in exercising their inherent and sovereign rights of
self-defense, which Article 51 says are not impaired in any way by the
Charter, and in carrying out "decisions" of the Security Council. Under
such circumstances, states could, for example, lawfully protect their citi-
zens abroad, intervene in situations of chaos or near chaos to restore
order, and participate in programs of collective self-defense like those of
NATO or SEATO and the campaign to protect South Korea which be-
gan in 1950. Correspondingly, it could be said with confidence that
states could not use force internationally to attack the territorial integrity
or political independence of other states, nor allow their territory to be
used for the purpose by armed bands, terrorists, or guerrillas, whether
idealists or mercenaries, whose goal was to weaken or overthrow the gov-
ernment of the victim state.
But is Article 2(4) now a norm of international law?
No statement can be considered a rule of law unless it is effectively
enforced-that is, unless the legal system responds to a breach by genu-
inely attempting to vindicate the purported norm. Thus in all states the
statute against murder is a true norm of law although many murders
occur, and not all murderers are captured and punished. A proposition
in the form of a rule of law can be considered a legal norm even if it is not
universally respected and enforced; but it cannot be characterized as a
norm if respect and enforcement are the exceptions rather than the rule.
By this standard, the status of Article 2(4) as law is now in doubt. Its
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text, condemning the use of force against the territorial integrity or polit-
ical independence of any state, surely purports to be a legal norm. And
the pattern of international behavior reveals that many states do habitu-
ally comply with the rule of Article 2(4). But does it in fact reflect the
will of the states and the general pattern of state practice? Does the soci-
ety of nations effectively oppose breaches of the nominal rule, and seek to
prevent acts which would violate it? Should the proposition advanced in
Article 2(4) now be considered not a current norm but an aspiration for
the international legal system, a guide to its future development? Or is it
no more than a utopian dream?
Article 2(4) of the Charter covers any and all uses of force or threats to
use force against the territorial integrity or political independence of
states-not only by means of visible armed attacks across state frontiers,
but also by means of assistance to any kind of insurrections against the
authority of the state under attack, including support for terrorists who
disrupt public order or assassinate officials. It includes not only actual
attacks but situations which the victim state perceives to be a threat of
force-for example, the secret deployment of missiles in Cuba by the So-
viet Union in 1962, which was neither an "armed attack" nor the threat
of an armed attack on the United States, since the state of the nuclear
balance in 1962 made a Soviet nuclear attack on the United States
inconceivable.
These rules derive from the nature of the state system. For centuries
they have been considered indispensable to the peaceful cooperation of
states. Violating these rules has always been treated as casus belli. This
remains the case under the Charter, as is reaffirmed in all the studies,
commission reports, and resolutions which have considered the problem
of aggression under United Nations auspices since the Charter was
adopted. For example, sending armed bands across a frontier to attack
the authority of a state, or failing to prevent such activities, as one of
those Reports said, is " a crime against humanity." Under Article 51, a
state which perceives the act or failure to act of another state as a breach
of Article 2(4)-there being no practicable peaceful remedy for the
breach-may use a reasonable and proportional amount of force by way
of self-help to eliminate the threat caused by the violation until the Secur-
ity Council decides otherwise. There is no requirement of Security
Council approval before force is used in self-defense.
Article 2(4) and Soviet Non-compliance
Since 1945, when the Charter of the United Nations was adopted, the
pattern of state practice has been clear. The Soviet Union has taken the
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position that Article 2(4) does not apply to it, and has commited acts of
aggression in violation of Article 2(4) hundreds if not thousands of times.
Many people assume that these familiar actions have somehow been le-
gitimated. But they cannot be reconciled with the policies and purposes
of the Charter. And they have not yet been legitimated by what Profes-
sor Richard Falk once called the "normative silence" of the state system.
For many years, a number of the most important Soviet acts of aggres-
sion were opposed and resisted by the United States and other nations
willing to rally to the cause of law. Thus, the Soviet Union's early post-
war probes against Iran, Greece, and Turkey were thrown back, the at-
tack on Berlin defeated, and the invasion of Korea repelled. But since
the tragic experience of the West with collective security in Korea and
Vietnam, the policy of containment initiated by President Truman has
flagged. It remains the nominal goal of the regional coalitions which
have been organized around the nuclear power of the United States to
deter and if necessary defeat Soviet or Soviet-inspired aggression in stra-
tegically important areas of the world. But it has become common-as
was the case during the 1930's-for friends and adversaries of the United
States alike to wonder whether the industrialized democracies would ac-
tually fight to protect their vital interests. Such doubts in themselves
constitute a persuasive invitation to war.
Since the withdrawal of the United States from Vietnam, the Soviet
program of expansion has gained in momentum. That program, fueled
by the aggressive use of force, and backed by the menace of nuclear and
chemical weapons, has gone too far, threatening the balance of power on
which the hope of peace depends. And the Soviet practice of aggression
is contagious. Iraq's armed attack on Iran and Argentina's armed attack
on the Falkland Islands are two among many recent episodes of aggres-
sion outside the immediate ambit of the Cold War. Unless the practice of
aggression is decisively stopped, Article 2(4) of the Charter will soon
cease to have any influence on the behavior of states, and we shall be
living once more in a condition of Hobbesian anarchy.
The Western states do not want this outcome; indeed, they fear it pro-
foundly. Anarchy has always led to general war and to the emergence of
tyrannies. But the Western nations will have no choice unless the Soviet
Union gives up its futile quest for empire and undertakes to live peace-
fully within its legitimate boundaries as a responsible member of the
United Nations. The democracies will not sit by while they are "nibbled
to death," in Adlai Stevenson's phrase.
Despite the constant pressure of Soviet aggression, the Western na-
tions have not yet abandoned Article 2(4). The forces resisting such a
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step are immensely powerful in the mind of the West. But the West will
be drawn into the whirlpool if the slide towards anarchy continues. The
recent uses of force by the United States, for example, are entirely justi-
fied under Article 51 and the precedent of our actions during the Cuban
Missile Crisis of 1962. In the Grenada operation, beyond the threat to
American nationals, the appeal of the Governor-General for help, the
disintegration of public order in Grenada, and the reaction of the nearby
island states, the United States perceived a .build-up of hostile forces
comparable to that involved in the Cuban Missile Crisis, and reacted
with proportional force to eliminate the threat at minimal cost. And in
Nicaragua, the active role of that country in supporting the insurrection
against the government of El Salvador alone justifies American assistance
in ending the attack. Self-defense in international law fully accepts the
right of the party attacked to deal with the delict as circumstances may
require. It is certainly free to enter the territory of its attacker if neces-
sary to eliminate the breach. This is the moral of the Caroline case.1
Secretary Shultz's speech of February 22, 1985 in San Francisco may
in part go beyond Article 51. He points out the absurdity of the Soviet
position in claiming a legal right to support insurrections against West-
ern governments while denying a parallel right to the United States and
its allies. 2 Secretary Shultz's comment is a fair warning of trends to
come if the Soviet drive for dominion continues.
Moreover, the United States is altogether correct under the Charter in
refusing to submit to the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice
(I.C.J.) in the Nicaragua case. The Charter system vests jurisdiction in
the Security Council to deal with acts of aggression, breaches of the
peace, and threats to the peace. The member states delegate authority to
the Council to deal with such matters, and agree to abide by the Coun-
cil's "decisions" respecting them. Under Article 51, members have the
right to exercise their right of self-defense until the Security Council-
not the I.C.J.-overrules their action. Article 2(4) is a derogation of the
sovereignty of all states, and a limitation on their historical freedom to
use force both for aggression and in self-defense. As an exception to the
normal rule of state sovereignty, that exception should be meticulously
interpreted. These dispositions, like the Security Council veto of its per-
manent members, reflect structural reality: the state system necessarily
rests on the will of the great powers. Of course, in attempting to preserve
or restore peace, the Council may refer questions to the I.C.J. or recom-
1. 2 J. MOORE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 409 (1906).
2. N.Y. Times, Feb. 23, 1985, at A4, col. 1.
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mend that the parties take issues to the I.C.J., as was the case in Corfu
Channel3 and the Namibia4 cases. This is an entirely different matter
from an unjustified assumption of jurisdiction by a tribunal which, like
all other international tribunals, can exercise its functions only upon the
consent of the sovereign parties.
Article 2(4) and the Future of the State System
In its modern form, the state system evolved from the efforts of the
leaders of the Congress of Vienna and some of their nineteenth century
successors. The Vienna system collapsed in 1914 and was reconstituted
and reformed in 1919 under the League of Nations. It collapsed again in
the 1930s and was recreated for a second time under the Charter of the
United Nations in 1945. Now the Charter of the United Nations is going
the way of the Covenant of the League. For the Western nations to
abandon the Charter as a guide to their own behavior under the pressure
of the Soviet thrust for power would be a catastrophe, signalling the com-
plete breakdown of the state system as a system of peace. In the nuclear
environment, that process threatens civilization itself.
At this moment, then, it is impossible to determine whether Article
2(4) of the Charter is an operative legal norm. On the other hand, it has
not yet disappeared either as an influence on state behavior or as an aspi-
ration for international law. Indeed, its restoration and fulfillment as the
keystone of the state system envisioned by the Charter is necessarily the
highest ambition of the foreign policies of the United States and its allies
in the Atlantic and Pacific Basins, of China, and of most of the smaller
states in the world. The urgency of that task is underlined by the shadow
of the nuclear weapon. The major risk of nuclear war is through the
escalation of conventional war. No one can guarantee that the fallible
human beings who control both nuclear and conventional weapons could
indefinitely refrain from using nuclear weapons under the stress of battle.
It follows, therefore, that it will be impossible to eliminate the serious
risk of nuclear war without eliminating war itself.
The question which invited my comments cannot be answered at this
time. The future course of world politics will determine-for a long time
to come-whether we soon achieve a state system in which aggression is
effectively forbidden by international law, or whether we are forced to
live in a condition of international anarchy, in which states are as free as
they were in the eighteenth century to make war at will.
3. (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4.
4. 1971 I.C.J. 16.
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